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the road. At the time of writing, critical decisions are about to be taken across the country. Unfortunately, the
level of debate about public and private insurance that has been sparked by Chaoulli reflects the poor account
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judges' poor appreciation of the interface between public and private health insurance across different health
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CHAOULLIS LEGACY FOR THE
FUTURE OF CANADIAN HEALTH
CARE POLICY©
COLLEEN M. FLOOD*
In Chaoulh; the majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada struck down a Quebec law that prohibited the
purchase of private health insurance for essential
hospital and physician services. The majority found it
to be in breach of the Quebec Charter of Human
Rights and Freedoms. The Court was split 3-3 on
whether it was also in breach of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. The decision was initially
considered of limited importance by many given that
technically it applied only to Quebec. In the six months
since the decision was released, however, it has
become clear that the legal impact of Chaoulliwill be
dwarfed by its normative impact on policy debates
across the country. Chaoulli has brought Canadian
medicare to a fork in the road. At the time of writing,
critical decisions are about to be taken across the
country. Unfortunately, the level of debate about
public and private insurance that has been sparked by
Chaoulli reflects the poor account of public and
private insurance dynamics in the Chaoulli decision
itself. This article discusses the majority judges' poor
appreciation of the interface between public and
private health insurance across different health care
systems and how, subsequently, this lack of
understanding has been reflected in media discussions
of policy options. The article also discusses likely
future challenges in other provinces before moving on
to the most critical aspect of all of this-governmental
response and what the future holds for Canadian
medicare.
Dans l'affaire Cbaoull la majorit6 des juges de la
Cour Supreme du Canada a annul6 une loi du Quebec
qui interdisait de souscrire une assurance sant6 priv~e
pour les services des h6pitaux et des mrdecins. La
majorite a constat6 que cette loi constituait une
violation de la Charte des droits et libertds de la
personne du Quebec. Les avis de la Cour 6taient
partagrs-3 contre 3-quand il s'agit de decider si la
loi constituait 6galement une violation de la Charte
canadienne des droits et liberids. Au depart,
l'ordonnance fut consid6re d'une importance, limit~e
par de nombreux observateurs car, A proprement
parler, elle ne s'appliquait qu'au Quebec. Cependant,
six mois apr~s l'entre en vigueur de l'ordonnance, il
est 6vident que les effets juridiques de I'affaire
Chaoulli seront attenurs par ses effets normatifs sur
les d~bats concernant les politiques, debats qui ont lieu
partout au pays. L'affaire Chaoullia men6 l'assurance
maladie canadienne A la croisre des chemins. Au
moment de rrdiger cet article, des d~cisions capitales
sont sur le point d'&tre prises dans le pays.
Malheureusement, le niveau du debat sur l'assurance
publique et de I'assurance priv~e, d~clench6 par
l'affaire Chaoull reflere la mauvaise perception, dans
l'ordonnance Chaoulli m~me, de la dynamique qui
rrgit l'assurance publique et l'assurance prive. Cet
article examine la mauvaise appreciation, par la
majorit6 des juges, du rapport entre I'assurance sante
publique et l'assurance sant6 privre, travers les
diffrrents syst~mes de soins de sant6 et la faqon dont,
par la suite, ce manque de comprehension s'est reflet6
dans le drbat, au sein des mdias, sur les options de
politiques. Par ailleurs, l'article discute les futurs drfis
probables dans les autres provinces, avant de passer au
volet le plus critique de l'ensemble: la reaction du
gouvernement, et l'avenir de l'assurance sant6 au
Canada.
© 2006, C.M. Flood.
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto; Canada Research Chair in
Health Law and Policy. The author wishes to thank Sasha Kontic for her research assistance and
Tony Duggan, Sujit Choudhry, Greig Hinds, Marie-Claude Premont, Steven Lewis, Greg
Marchildon, Duncan Sinclair, Lorne Sossin, Michael Trebilcock, Roy Romanow, Robert
McMurtry, and Kent Roach for their comments. All errors and omissions are the author's.
274 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 44, NO. 2
I. IN T R O D U C TIO N ................................................................................................ 274
II. THE COURT'S GRASP OF HEALTH CARE POLICY ................................. 275
A. Portraying Canada as an Oddity ............................................................... 277
B. Portraying Canadian Medicare as Inferior .............................................. 279
C. Comparing European Apples and Oranges ............................................. 282
1. Solidarity in a Group-Based System ............................................. 283
2. Co-paym ent System s ..................................................................... 284
3. The Right Comparison: Countries with Duplicate or "Top-Up"
Private Insurance ........................................................................... 286
4. Measures Taken in Countries that Allow Two-Tier to Limit
Private Insurance ............................... ............................................ 288
5. The Problem of Capacity Being Transferred from the Public to
the Private Sectors ......................................................................... 289
III. THE IMPACT OF CHAOULLION PUBLIC DEBATE AND POLICY ...... 293
A . Supporters of M edicare ............................................................................. 293
B. N ewspaper Com m entary ........................................................................... 295
IV. UNCERTAINTY AND FUTURE LITIGATION ............................................. 298
V. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE ....................................................................... 300
A . R educe W ait Tim es ................................................................................... 300
B. Charter-Proof through LegalReforms .................................................... 301
C. Capitulate and/or Celebrate and Allow Private Health Insurance ........ 302
D. Ouebec's Choice .................................... ................. 303
E. Private Insurance ............................................................ 306
F. A lberta's Stance ........................................................................................ 307
VI. CONCLUSION .............................................. 309
I. INTRODUCTION
Much has already been written about the Chaoullidecision,1 but
its full policy impact has yet to be played out. Initially, the importance of
the decision was considered by many to be limited given that technically
it applied only to Quebec. Moreover, the Quebec government could
choose to respond not by abandoning single-tier medicare, but through
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 [Chaoulhl. See Colleen M.
Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, eds., Access to Care, Access to Justice The Legal Debate Over
Private Health Insurance in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).
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reducing wait times to what the court considers a reasonable length. In
the six months since the decision was released, however, it has become
clear that the legal impact of Chaoulliwill be dwarfed by its normative
impact on policy debates. Prior to Chaoulli advocates of privatization
were discounted as either ideologues or speaking from the perspective
of their own vested interests-for example, private clinics that would
reap financial gains from further privatization of Canadian medicare.
Now, however, these positions have the normative imprimatur of
legitimacy (indeed superiority) from no lesser body than the Supreme
Court of Canada. The debate has swung widely from when discussion of
anything other than public funding was akin to heresy to now, when the
only option on the table is private health insurance.'
All of this has brought Canadian medicare to a fork in the road.
At the time of writing, critical decisions are about to be made across the
country. Unfortunately, the level of debate about public and private
insurance sparked by Chaoulli reflects the poor account of public and
private insurance dynamics in the Chaoulli decision itself. Below, I will
discuss the majority judges' poor appreciation of the interface between
public and private health insurance across different health care systems
and how, subsequently, this lack of understanding has been reflected in
media discussions of policy options. I will then discuss the likelihood of
future challenges to legislation in other provinces before moving on to
the most critical aspect of all of this-governmental response and what
the future holds for Canadian medicare.
II. THE COURT'S GRASP OF HEALTH CARE POLICY
In Chaoulhi Justice Deschamps, writing for a slim majority (it
was a 4-3 decision), dismissed the Quebec government's claim that the
law prohibiting private health insurance is necessary to protect the
public health care system. The majority found this law to be in breach of
the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (Quebec
2 Bernard M. Dickens, "The Chaoulli Judgment: Less Than Meets the Eye--or More" in
Flood, Roach & Sossin, ibid. at 19.
' See e.g. Medicare Schmedicare (International Documentary Television in association
with the CBC, 2005), a documentary filmed in private clinics in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver
that compared the wait times for those who use private health care services as compared to those
who use the public health care system; CBC News, The Passionate Eye, "Medicare Schmedicare" (8
December 2005), online: < http:/Avww.cbc.ca/passionateeye/medicare.html >.
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Charter).' Justice Deschamps did not rule on the challenge to the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,5 but the other majority
judges (Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major, writing for
themselves and Justice Bastarache) did. These three judges concluded
that, in addition to breaching the Quebec Charter, the law was
"arbitrary" and thus in breach of section 7 of the Charter and could not
be saved by section 1. The minority found Quebec's law prohibiting
private insurance did not breach either the Quebec Charter or the
Charter. Thus, on the critical issue of the Charter (and the application
of Chaoullito similar laws in other provinces), the court was split 3-3.
The majority did a quick survey of health care systems around
the world. Justice Deschamps' judgment reviewed the health care
systems in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
New Zealand, Australia, and Sweden. Drawing on the Kirby report,6
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major outlined the basics of the
Swiss, German, and British systems with passing reference to Australia,
Singapore, and the United States. Their primary purpose was to
demonstrate that public and private insurance co-exist in a number of
jurisdictions. They concluded that "many western democracies that do
not impose a monopoly on the delivery of health care have successfully
delivered to their citizens medical services that are superior to and more
affordable than the services that are presently available in Canada."7
However, they provided no discussion of the factors that led them to
such a damning conclusion.8
There are many errors in the majority judgment and many errors
in their conclusions vis- -vis health policy.9 I will focus on three. First, I
will contest the characterization of Canada as an oddity in having a goal
4 R.S.Q. c. C-12.
' Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [Charte].
6 Canada, The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, The
Health of Canadians - The Federal Role: Health Care Systems in Other Countries (Interim
Report) vol. 3 (Ottawa: Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology,
2002) (Chair: Michael J. L. Kirby).
' Chaoull supra note 1 at 854 [emphasis added].
'Colleen M. Flood, Mark Stabile & Sasha Kontic, "Finding Health Policy 'Arbitrary': The
Evidence on Waiting, Dying, and Two-Tier Systems" in Flood, Roach & Sossin, supra note 1, 296 at
307.
9 We discuss these in Flood, Stabile & Kontic, ibid.
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of preventing a flourishing two-tier system. Second, I will contest the
conclusion that Canada's system is inferior to other health care systems.
Third, and most seriously, I will discuss the majority's failure to
distinguish between countries that allow parallel or duplicate private
health insurance (such as would be allowed after Chaouli) and those
countries in which private insurance plays a role but not for the
purposes of enabling those who hold it to jump wait-list queues. In this
context, I will discuss the failure of the majority to consider why many
countries take a range of legal measures to protect their respective
public systems from a duplicate private tier. The primary goal of
countries that take these measures is to protect valuable capacity (the
work time of specialists and other medical professionals) in the public
system-a goal that the majority judges completely dismiss.
A. Portraying Canada as an Oddity
The majority judges characterize Canada as an outlier from the
rest of the world in prohibiting private health insurance for essential
hospital and physician services. But they do not note that Canada tied
for third place in the OECD in 2003 with respect to the extent to which
private insurance plays a role in financing the health care system."0 The
private sector, both in financing and delivery, plays a very significant
role in the Canadian system already. Where Canada differs (although
only in six provinces including Quebec) is in explicitly prohibiting
private health insurance for "medically necessary" hospital and
physician services. But one cannot write off the Canadian health care
system on this basis alone as akin to that of Cuba or North Korea."
'o Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Health Data 2005,
CD-ROM: OECD Health Data 2005. Statistics and Indicators for 30 Countries, (Paris: OECD, 2005).
Figures show that in both Canada and France private health insurance accounts for 12.7 per cent of
total health spending. Health care financed by private insurance is highest in the United States, at
36.7 per cent, which reflects the fact that private insurance is the dominant form of coverage in this
country. The Netherlands, where private insurance is the primary payer for more than 30 per cent
of the population, reports the second highest level of financing at 17.2 per cent. According to OECD
statistics for 2003, private insurance accounts for less than 10 per cent of total health expenditure in
all remaining OECD countries supplying such information.
" The comparison seems to originate from the following opinion piece: David Gratzer,
"Wanted: Credible Health Care Analysis" (1998) 7:2 Fraser Institute Canadian Student Review,
online: Fraser Institute <http://oldfraser.lexi.net/publications/csr/1998/september/healthcare_
analysis.html>.
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Where Canada does not differ from other countries is in trying
to suppress through legal means a flourishing private sector for essential
care. As I will discuss further, below in Part II.C, many countries use a
range of other indirect methods apart from expressly prohibiting private
health insurance in order to protect their public systems. As a result of
the majority's misunderstanding of the prevalence of this policy
objective, the consequences of Chaoulli are much worse than originally
envisaged; it provides the basis for some governments (at the time of
writing: Quebec, Alberta, and British Columbia) to consider removing
the prohibition against doctors working in both the public and private
sectors simultaneously. In my view, this law performs a much more
important role in protecting the public system than the laws banning
private health insurance which were the subject of the Chaoullidecision.
Indeed, the latter is almost a red herring as evidenced by the fact that
some provinces (New Brunswick, Newfoundland & Labrador, Nova
Scotia, and Saskatchewan) do not ban private insurance and yet still do
not have a flourishing two-tier system. Why is this? It is because unless a
significant number of doctors work in the private sector, for at least part
of their time, there are no private services to insure.
2
The majority judgment written by Justice Deschamps
acknowledged that laws such as those prohibiting physicians working
simultaneously in both the public and private sectors are taken in
various jurisdictions to protect the integrity of the public insurance
systems. This is both heartening yet bewildering given that, on the one
hand, she appears to endorse these laws, and yet, on the other hand, she
completely rejects Quebec's arguments as to why it is necessary to
protect the public tier from private insurance. The same arguments
justifying the measures she seems to approve of also justify the law
banning private health insurance. If these arguments are rejected in the
context of a challenge to a law prohibiting private health insurance for
essential care, it is at least possible that it may also be rejected in the
context of challenges to other laws, such as those preventing doctors
working simultaneously in both the public and the private insurance
sectors.
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major in their analysis of
section 7 of the Charter fail to mention that other provinces and a
,2 Colleen Flood & Tom Archibald, "The Illegality of Private Health Care in Canada"
(2001) 164:6 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 825.
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number of European countries take measures (short of prohibiting
private health insurance) to severely limit the scope of a duplicate
private tier. By ignoring this fact Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice
Major are much more readily able to dismiss the Quebec government's
claim that it is a legitimate policy objective to protect public medicare
from the emergence of a duplicate private tier. They do this by
characterizing Canada's aspirations in this regard as odd compared to
other countries. If they had acknowledged that a number of other
countries take legal measures to protect their public systems from a
duplicate private tier, it would have been much more difficult to
describe Quebec's law prohibiting private health insurance as
"arbitrary. '
"13
B. Portraying Canadian Medicare as Inferior
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major reach the damning
conclusion that other jurisdictions that "do not impose a monopoly"
have "delivered to their citizens medical services that are superior to
and more affordable than the services that are presently available in
Canada."' 4 For health policy experts, this is a breathtaking conclusion.
The intractability of comparing different health systems is well
accepted. 15
First, with regard to "affordability," presumably they are not
speaking from an individual perspective, as further privatization must
result in more direct costs to individuals either through private
insurance premiums or out-of-pocket payments and thus decreased
affordability. I assume therefore they are referring to the overall
1 Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major further discount governmental arguments
(and the evidence of expert witnesses) about the detrimental effect of a private tier on a public
system and seem to accept that there is no downside to allowing a private tier.
14 Chaoulh4 supra note 1 at 854.
's For example, in 2000 the World Health Organization completed its first study of health
systems and ranked Canada as thirtieth out of 191 member states. But the controversial analysis has
been roundly criticized because it focused on just five factors, which caused the study to discount
Canada's excellent health outcomes. Our health care system was downgraded due to the high
overall educational levels of Canadian citizens, on the basis that education is a significant
determinant of health status. In other words, because Canadians are more highly educated than, for
example, the citizens of France, our otherwise excellent performance on health care outcomes like
infant mortality and life expectancy was severely discounted. See Raisa Deber, "Why Did the
World Health Organization Rate Canada's Health System as 30th? Some Thoughts on League
Tables" (2004) 2:1 Longwoods Review 2.
2006]
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affordability of the system as measured by total spending as a
percentage of GDP. Here it is true that Canada is clustered in the top ten
of OECD member countries in terms of total health care spending,16 but
it is not out of line with other countries of comparable wealth. As the
wealth of a country increases, so does the total percentage of its wealth
devoted to health care-in this regard Canada is exactly where it should
be in terms of total health care spending.
The fact that Canada spends more on health care than some
other countries does not reveal much. It is important to note that setting
aside drug spending, the vast majority of total health care spending is for
the remuneration paid to health professionals. Indeed, Canada pays its
professionals higher rates than some other jurisdictions, yet many still
feel that we do not pay these professionals enough. Thus, the fact that
we spend more on health in Canada than the United Kingdom or New
Zealand does not itself mean that the money is wasted (or at least no
more than in any other system 7). All it means is that we remunerate our
health professionals at rates consistent with our total level of wealth.
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major also failed to note that
countries with higher rates of private spending (Canada already records
high rates of private spending compared to many other countries)
record higher levels of overall (public and private combined) spending.18
For example, the U.S. government already pays more public funds per
capita than the Canadian government despite leaving over 14 per cent of
the U.S. population uninsured. 9 By extrapolation, it is obvious that
allowing more privatization of the system will increase, not decrease,
overall spending or "affordability."
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major boldly state that
other countries deliver "superior" medical services than are presently
delivered in Canada. Again, it is hard to know what they really mean by
16 Supra note 10. In 2003, Canada tied Greece for seventh place in the OECD in terms of
total health care spending measured as a percentage of GDP.
" See Alan Maynard, "How to Defend a Public Health Care System: Lessons From
Abroad" in Flood, Roach & Sossin, supra note 1, 237.
8 Francesca Colombo & Nicole Tapay, "Private Health Insurance in OECD Countries: The
Benefits and Costs for Individuals and Health Systems" (2004) 15 OECD Health Working Papers at
15, online: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/56/33698043.pdf>.
"9 Canadian Institute for Health Information, Exploring the 7030 Split How Canada's
Health Care System is Financed (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2005), online:
<http://secure.cihi.ca/cihiweb/dispPage.jsp?cw_page=AR_1282E&cwtopic= 1282>.
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this. One assumes that they do not mean the quality of individual
services delivered to patients by clinics and hospitals since there is no
evidence to support this. So, one must assume that in the context of the
facts of Chaoullithey are referring to the problem of wait times and that
the "superiority" of other jurisdictions relates to the fact that either
there is no waiting or their wait times are shorter than those recorded in
Canada. But in support of this conclusion they make no reference to
wait times in other countries. Had they done so, they would have found
that Canada is far from alone in its struggle with wait times and that
many other countries also struggle with this problem-including those
that allow private health insurance for essential services.
A recent review of wait times in OECD countries irrefutably
demonstrates that many countries with two-tier systems (in which
citizens may purchase private insurance to cover essential hospital and
physician services) also struggle with waiting lists. As Figure 1, below,
shows, other countries within which waiting lists are a significant policy
concern include Australia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom.20 The Deschamps and the McLachlin/Major judgments each
refer favourably to these countries but do not discuss wait times. This
oversight is difficult to understand when waiting for care is at the heart
of the constitutional challenge before the Court. It is also surprising that
they did not consider that a number of the countries that do not have
wait-time problems have other access problems. For instance, the
United States does not have a waiting list problem but records 45.8
million people as uninsured.21 France has very high out-of-pocket
payments at the point of service that likely deter those on low incomes
from accessing care.22
20 See Luigi Siciliani & Jeremy Hurst, "Explaining Waiting Times Variations for Elective
Surgery Across OECD Countries" (2003) 7 OECD Health Working Papers, online:
<http://www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/31/10/17256025.pdf>.
21 Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette D. Proctor & Cheryl Hill Lee, Income, Poverty, and
Health Insurance Coverage in the United States 2004, (Current Population Reports) (P60-229)
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), online: U.S. Census Bureau
< http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf>.
22 Paul Dourgnon & Michel Grignon, "Le tiers-payant est-il inflationniste?" (2000)
CREDES Working Paper at 27, cited in Agnes Couffinhal, Val6rie Paris & CREDES, "Cost
Sharing in France" (2003) CREDES Working Paper at 4-5, online: <http://www.irdes.fr/
english/wp/CostSharing.pdf>. Note that when a patient is hospitalized, the patient is only
2006]
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Figure 1: Countries With and Without a Waiting List Problem









Ono wait list problem 2
Source: OECD HEALTH DATA 2005 U wait list problem exists
C. Comparing European Apples and Oranges
There is another difficulty with both the Deschamps and the
McLachlin/Major judgments: their summative roundup of the
experiences in other health care jurisdictions fails to distinguish between
different systems that combine public and private insurance, assuming
that the only purpose of private insurance is to "top-up" the quality of
health care offered in the public system.
It is a fundamental error to treat all health care systems with
some role for private insurance as the same. There are a number of
distinct ways of financing health care, all with different consequences for
equity and efficiency. Below, I will discuss three different systems of
public and private insurance. First, I will discuss group-based systems
responsible for the co-payment fee, as the hospital is paid directly by the sickness fund for its share
of the treatment.
'3 Carolyn Tuohy, Colleen Flood & Mark Stabile have identified four basic models of
structuring the relationship between public and private financing: parallel public and private
systems; co-payment; group-based; and sectoral. See Carolyn Hughes Tuohy, Colleen M. Flood &
Mark Stabile, "How Does Private Finance Affect Public Health Care Systems? Marshalling the
Evidence from OECD Nations" (2004) 29 J. Health Pol. 359.
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where private insurance is purchased by the wealthy but, in
contradistinction to what the Chaoulli decision endorses, is not used
primarily, if at all, for the purposes of jumping wait-list queues. Second,
I will discuss co-payment systems, such as those in France, where private
insurance is used to cover higher out-of-pocket payments imposed in the
public system. Third, I will discuss duplicate insurance or two-tier
systems where the primary purpose of private insurance is to allow those
who hold it to jump wait-list queues. Countries that have these kinds of
systems include New Zealand, Ireland, Australia, and the United
Kingdom among others, and it is these countries that the Court should
have closely examined. In this context, I will also discuss countries (ie.
Sweden) that ostensibly permit the purchase of private insurance for the
purposes of queue-jumping, but take other measures, such as preventing
physicians from working simultaneously in both the public and private
sectors, that effectively preclude the development of a two-tier system.
1. Solidarity in a Group-Based System
The Court refers favourably to the Netherlands and Germany,
but these countries are not operating two-tier systems in the sense the
majority in Chaoulli has in mind, where individuals are allowed to buy
parallel or duplicate private coverage to jump queues in the public
system. The Netherlands and Germany each have what I would
characterize as a group-based system. In group-based systems private
insurers do not perform a duplicate role-as would be allowed by the
Chaoulli decision-allowing people to jump queues for treatment.
Instead, private insurance provides full (as opposed to duplicate)
coverage for the wealthier segments of the population that buy it.
To elaborate, an individual earning less than 33 thousand euros
(48 thousand Canadian dollars) in the Netherlands must contribute to
and is eligible for social insurance that is similar in its progressive nature
to Canadian medicare, although it is not financed primarily out of
general taxation revenues but rather through employer and employee
contributions. Dutch citizens earning more than 33 thousand euros are
not insured by the social insurance scheme but can buy private
insurance, and most do. The private insurance they purchase, however,
2006]
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does not "top up" coverage in the public system as would be allowed by
Chaoulli, it covers all the needs of those who elect to buy it.
24
To reiterate and underscore the fact that buying private
insurance does not allow queue-jumping or preferential treatment,
regulation requires that Dutch specialists be paid the same fee by
private insurers as by the social insurers. Moreover, it is part of the
ethical code of Dutch physicians not to treat patients with social
insurance or private insurance differently.26
To be clear, (in case you are wondering why anyone would
purchase private health insurance) wealthier individuals are not publicly
insured. If they do not buy private insurance, then they are uninsured. In
short, through different means the Dutch system achieves exactly the
same progressive outcome as Canadian medicare where access to
essential care is determined on the basis of need, not ability to pay.
Private health insurance has a role, but only as a way of financing the
system, not as a way of enabling those with means to get faster or better
care. Chaoulhi though, finds that there is a constitutional right for those
with means to buy their way to the front of wait-list queues.
2. Co-payment Systems
Co-payment systems also provide public coverage but impose
large co-payments or user charges ahd, therefore, allow the purchase of
private health insurance to help defray those out-of-pocket costs. This
occurs in the U.S. medicare system (for those over sixty-five years of
age) and in France. In France, the co-payments range from 20 per cent
on hospital care, 35 per cent (usually) on prescription drugs, and 30 per
cent for private physician visits (majority of physicians in France practise
privately and provide day treatments or day surgeries). The co-payments
24 For a discussion, see Jurgen Wasem, Stefan GreB & Keike G.H. Okma, "The Role of
Private Health Insurance in Social Health Insurance Countries" in Richard B. Saltman, Reinhard
Busse & Josep Figueras, eds., Social Health Insurance Systems in Western Europe (London: Open
University Press, 2004) 227.
25 This is similar to the mechanism employed in the provinces of Nova Scotia, Ontario, and
Manitoba to protect public medicare, namely preventing physicians charging more privately than
they may publicly for the same essential services.
26 The Dutch Professional Guidelines for Doctors, found in the Individual Health Care
Professions Act, states at Article 11.2 that doctors have to treat patients equally in equal cases. See
Hans Akveld & Herbert Hermans, "The Netherlands" in H. Nys, ed., International Encyclopaedia
ofLaws: Medical Law, looseleaf (The Hague: Kiuwer Law International, 2003).
[VOL. 44, NO. 2
Chaoulli s Legacy
are intended to promote patient responsibility in using health care
resources, but they may also have the adverse effect of limiting access to
services for those who cannot afford to pay the out-of-pocket costs. So,
although France does not appear to have a wait-list problem, this may
be due to the fact that some people cannot pay the high out-of-pocket
costs required to access the system (in other words, they don't get into
the system to wait). In addition to co-payments, access in France is also
limited by the requirement that patients pay a health care professional
upfront for a service and submit the bill twice: once to their social
security insurer for partial reimbursement, and then to their private
insurer to recover the co-payment.27
In France, citizens buy private health insurance to cover the
costs of co-payments and user charges imposed in the public sphere.
The level of private insurance varies; the best coverage is usually linked
to type of employment and income. As a result, the lowest income
earners in France have the least private insurance coverage and the
highest co-payments. 2 To remedy this problem in part, public
complementary insurance was put in place for the most poor in 2000.
As in a number of other countries, France requires the fees
charged by a doctor in the private sector to be set by a government
committee (doctors in the public system are paid on salary) in order to
prevent the loss of doctors from the public to the private sector.29 From
1980, the rules were modified, allowing any privately practising doctor to
become what is known as a Sector 2 doctor and to bill above the
government-set tariff. But concerns about fairness, access, and the
failure of price competition to manifest itself resulted in a change in the
policy in the early 1990s.3° The new policy dramatically reduced the
2 Couffinhal, Paris & CREDES, supra note 22.
28 The only study that has explicitly measured equity in the finance of the French health
care system was undertaken in the early 1990s. See Eddy van Doorslaer & Adam Wagstaff, "Equity
in the Finance of Health Care: Methods and Findings" in Eddy van Doorslaer, Adam Wagstaff &
Frans Rutten, eds., Equity in the Finance and Delivery of Health Care: An International
Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19 93) 20.
29 In France there is a plurality of health care delivery methods--either through public or
private hospitals or by self-employed private physicians. The public and private sectors for the most
part deliver different types of care, and social insurance covers both public and private care. The
private sector is not meant to be a second tier.
3 Since 1980, doctors in France have been able to extra-bill (or charge a "d6passement") by
choosing to be a Sector 2 doctor. However, by 1990, only 68.2 per cent of doctors were applying the
negotiated tariff (57 per cent of specialists). There was no proof of improved quality being offered
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number of doctors able to qualify to practise in Sector 2. Currently,
about 24 per cent of French doctors in the private sector are able to bill
at fees higher than the public tariff, but this percentage will decrease
since only a very limited number of new doctors are able to earn the
right to be classified in Sector 2 each year.31 Thus, France also takes
measures to protect the integrity of its public system and mitigate the
loss of doctors from the public to the private sector. Why would France
do this if there are no adverse ramifications in allowing privately paying
patients to buy their way to the front of queues?
3. The Right Comparison: Countries with Duplicate or "Top-Up"
Private Insurance
Both the Dutch and German group-model and the French co-
payment model are very different from the kind of system likely to
emerge in post-ChaoulliCanada.
In order to mimic the European models touted by the -majority
as superior to the Canadian system, the entire funding base of medicare
would have to change from tax funds to social insurance premiums.
Moreover, the other extensive social welfare programs of Northern
European countries would need to be implemented. If we were to follow
the French model, large user charges and out-of-pocket payments would
have to be introduced at point of service (in France they are about 30
per cent of the specialist fee 32) and government subsidies put in place to
help the poor to cover those costs. If we were to replicate either the
German or Dutch model, wealthier citizens would either be excluded
(the Dutch model) or given a once-in-a-lifetime opt-out (German
model) from the public system and would have to pay for insurance
covering all their health care needs. Unlike these models, Chaoulli
envisages all Canadians retaining public insurance, and then allowing
by the Sector 2 doctors and the market provided little control over competitive pricing as the Sector
2 fees were 45 per cent higher than the conventional tariff. See Jean-Pierre Poullier & Simone
Sandier, "France" (2000) 25 J. Health Pol. 899 at 902-03.
" Thomas C. Buchmueller & Agnes Couffinhal, "Private Health Insurance in France"
(2004) 12 OECD Health Working Papers at 10, online: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/11/
30455292.pdf>; World Health Organization, "Highlights on Health, France 2004," online:
<http://www.euro.who.int/eprise/main/who/progs/chhfra/system/20050131_1>.
' Buchmueller & Couffinhal, ibid. See also Couffinhal, Paris & CREDES, supra note 22 at
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those with means to spend relatively marginal amounts of money to
achieve preferential treatment and queue-jumping. This would produce
in Canada what is best described as a duplicate or top-up private
insurance system.
Post-Chaoulll the Canadian system may more likely come to
resemble the systems in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Australia,
Ireland, Sweden, Spain, Luxembourg, Greece, and Italy. It is these
countries that the majority should have considered in detail rather than
countries like the Netherlands, Germany, and France which are too
dissimilar in fundamental respects to be comparable. In the former
countries, private insurance duplicates coverage of services that are
publicly insured. In a number of them, particularly in those where wait
time is a significant problem, physicians work in both the public and
private sectors, "topping-up" their public sector incomes with private
payments. Examination of countries with duplicate public insurance
shows that, like Canada, they have also wrestled with chronic waiting
lists.33 An article I co-wrote with my colleagues at the University of
Toronto that was quoted by Justice Deschamps in support of the
different configurations of public and private insurance also included
data showing that reported waiting lists in the United Kingdom and New
Zealand were, respectively, three and five times longer than waiting lists
reported by the Fraser Institute in Canada. 34 This research was not
commented on, nor was it rebutted.
It is true that, recently, wait times in New Zealand and the
United Kingdom appear to have been reduced. But there are two
critically important factors to consider before leaping to any adverse
conclusions about the relative merits of the Canadian system. The first is
that reduction in waiting lists in the United Kingdom is due to the
injection of large amounts of public funding into the National Health
Service, not an expansion of the role of private health insurance. The
Blair government has also tried to ameliorate the effects of allowing
duplicate private health insurance in the United Kingdom through new
contracts with consultants that limit the amount of time they can spend
in the private sector.
For a discussion, see Tuohy, Flood & Stabile, supra note 23.
34 Ibid. at 374.
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In New Zealand, wait times have been reduced by managerial
fiat; now an individual cannot be put on a public waiting list unless the
system is able to meet his or her needs within six months. If the system
cannot cope, the patient is sent back to her family doctor to "manage"
her needs until the public system is able to meet them or the patient
pays for the service privately-a de facto queue has formed for the
waiting list.35 But these "waiting lists" for the real waiting lists are not
centrally recorded and cannot readily be used to criticize government
performance. This latter experience illustrates that it is easier to ration
more harshly in a system where the political elites, themselves holding
private health insurance, are not subjected to the rationing process-a
phenomena completely discounted by the majority.
4. Measures Taken in Countries that Allow Two-Tier to Limit
Private Insurance
Many countries that prima facie allow top-up or duplicate
private health insurance, ie. they do not have a law explicitly prohibiting
it, have other laws to limit the deleterious effects of the private tier on
the public system. For example, Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice
Major discuss the small amount of private insurance in Sweden, but
they fail to mention that physicians there are prohibited from working in
both the public and the private sectors. Swedish physicians must choose
one or the other, and this inability to operate primarily in the public
system with a top-up from the private sector provides a brake on the
extent to which the private sector can develop at the expense of the
public system. Similar measures are taken in other two-tier systems,
namely Luxembourg, Greece, and Italy.36 Why would these countries
take these measures if, as the majority concludes, there is no basis for
concern in allowing a private tier? In Canada, similar laws exist in every
province except for Newfoundland & Labrador.37 Presumably, in
3 Robin Guald & Sarah Derrett, "Solving the Surgical Waiting List Problem? New
Zealand's 'Booking System' (2000) 15 Int'l J. Health Plann. Mgmt. 259, online: Wiley InterScience
<http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/77002023/PDFSTART>; New Zealand
National Party, Press Release, "Patients Struck Off Second Waiting List" (18 April 2006), online:
Scoop <http://www.scoop.co/nz/stories/PA0604/S00299.htm>.
3 6 Supra note 18 at 24, n. 38.
37 Flood & Archibald, supra note 12.
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Newfoundland & Labrador the potential private market is insufficient
to flourish even in the absence of laws suppressing it.
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major conclude that
Quebec's law prohibiting private health insurance fails to accord with
the principles of fundamental justice on the basis that it is "arbitrary."
They reach this conclusion based on their cursory review of the
dynamics of other jurisdictions, from which they conclude that public
and private insurance co-exists in certain countries and infer that the
former remains viable. They dismiss arguments about the detrimental
effects of a private tier on the public system merely on the basis that in
other countries public and private insurance co-exist. But as I have
shown, the dynamics of public and private insurance and regulation is
far more complex than they allow for, and many jurisdictions take
measures to try to achieve the same goal as in Quebec, namely
protecting the public system from a private sector.38
5. The Problem bf Capacity Being Transferred from the Public to
the Private Sectors
Why do countries have laws such as those preventing physicians
from receiving both public insurance and private payment for the
delivery of essential services? The key issue is one of capacity: the time
specialists and medical professionals spend working in the public system.
If specialists are free to work simultaneously in the public and private
systems, then a disproportionate amount of their time will be spent in
the private sector-a problem that will be exacerbated by the
differences in fees paid by the respective sectors.39 In other words, to the
extent that prices are higher in the private sector and where specialists
are free to do so, they will devote an increasing proportion of their time
to private patients who are likely to have less acute or serious needs
than those patients left behind in the public system. This is not, as the
38 The dissent however was more sensitive to the complexity of health care financing in
their treatment of evidence from other jurisdictions. They criticize the majority's treatment of this
evidence in Chaoulll4 supra note 1 at 891-94.
3 9 U.K., Select Committee on Health, Memorandum by Professor David Light: Testimony
on its Inquiry into Consultants' Contracts (App. 8 to Health-Third Report) (London: House of
Commons, 2000), online: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/
cmhealth/586/586ap17.htm>.
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majority judges variously allege, merely a "theoretical, 4' argument or
one based only on "human reactions ' 'a1 or "common sense as opposed
to evidence.
Evidence in support of these preventive laws includes the fact
that many countries have similar laws. Why take these measures if there
is no concern about capacity? There is more direct evidence. New
Zealand has a two-tier system in which specialists are free to work in
both the public and private spheres. It has had a chronic problem with
waiting lists (although, as mentioned before, these are now not reported
centrally).43 The New Zealand Medical Council reported that in 2000,
New Zealand specialists spent only 48.9 per cent of their time working
in public hospitals. They devoted most of the remaining 51.1 per cent of
the time to their private practices.44 The consequences for public sector
waiting lists and the public sector itself in Canada would be enormous if
specialists were allowed to devote only 50 per cent of their time to
working in public hospitals even when allowing for significant increases
in productivity (i e. physicians working more efficiently or longer hours).
Inevitably, wait times in the public system would lengthen. Moreover,
there would be profound and lingering effects (i.e. the amount of time
that specialists would spend training junior doctors in the public
system).
There is also judicial recognition in other countries of the
relationship between waiting lists and duplicate private insurance
systems. The Commerce Commission v. The Ophthalmological Society
of New Zealand45 involved a New Zealand funding authority seeking to
4 See Chaoul, supra note 1 at 852, where McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J. say: "In order
not to be arbitrary, the limit on life, liberty and security requires not only a theoretical connection
between the limit and the legislative goal, but a real connection on the facts."
4' Ibid. at 828, Deschamps J.
42 Ibid. at 853, McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J.
4J The extent to which New Zealand wait times apparently seem to have fallen is due to a'
managerial sleight of hand rather than any substantive reform. The New Zealand booking system
now requires that a patient not be put on a wait-list unless the system has the resources to meet the
need within six months. If not, then the patient is referred back to his or her family doctor to
"manage" the care until when (if ever) the system is able to meet the patient's need or the nature of
the need changes so that it requires prioritization-in other words the patient gets much worse.
44 Medical Council of New Zealand, The New Zealand Medical Workforce in 2000
(Wellington: Medical Council of New Zealand, 2000) at 14, online: <http://www.mcnz.org.nz/
portals/0/publications/workforce%202000.pdf >.
- (2004), 10 TCLR 994 (H.C.).
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reduce long wait times for cataract surgery in the public sector by
contracting Australian ophthalmologists to perform 225 operations
during January 1997. The New Zealand High Court found that the
group of ophthalmologists and their Society breached section 27 of the
Commerce Act4 6 (New Zealand's competition legislation) by being party
to an arrangement designed to hinder Australian doctors from
performing routine cataract surgery in New Zealand. The judgment
includes excerpts from correspondence that make very clear the
connection between long wait times in the public system and surgeons'
personal income. In a letter to the funding authority, one of the doctors
involved describes the marked reduction in public wait times for cataract
surgery that would occur as a result of the proposed extra surgery and
how that would detrimentally affect his private practice:
Whilst this will have a devastating effect on my private practice with a markedly reduced
number of private cataract referrals and cataract operations at Southern Cross Hospital
over the new year or more as more people opt for public hospital surgery, my ongoing
commitment to the Public Hospital Service now and in the future is however such that I
am still prepared to assist just as I did when I performed the extra 66 outpatient clinics
seeing 700 extra new patients over the last 2 years when it would have clearly been
financially more advantageous for me not to have done this.4 7
The New Zealand High Court concludes that this particular
surgeon knew of the impact that shorter waiting times in the public
system would have on his private income and, despite his protestations
to the contrary, had worked actively to thwart efforts to employ
Australian surgeons to reduce public sector wait times.
In the United Kingdom, too, specialists are free to work
simultaneously in the public and private sectors. In recognition of the
concern that consultants are spending too much time treating private
patients and not enough for the public sector, the U.K. government has
recently tried to introduce productivity measures in the public sector.48
In its evidence to the Select Committee on Health, the Department of
Health stated that there was a statistical correlation between those
specialties with the longest waiting lists and those with private practice
46 (N.Z.), 1986/5.
4 7Supra note 45 at 1013.
4'Alan Maynard & Karen Bloor, "Reforming the Consultant Contract Again?" (2004) 329
Brit. Med. J. 929.
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earnings making up a substantial part of consultants' incomes.49 The
Committee ultimately recommended that physicians be prohibited from
working in the public and private sectors at the same time.5 °
A recent study conducted in 2005 in Australia also clearly
demonstrated that the higher the proportion of private activity in any
particular sector, the longer the wait in the public system."
Within Canada itself there is clear evidence of the detrimental
impact on public sector waiting lists from allowing a private tier in which
physicians can work simultaneously in both the public and private
sectors. A 1998 study in Manitoba of cataract surgery which, for a
period, was provided by cataract surgeons who were free to work in both
sectors, showed that waiting times were, unsurprisingly, lowest of all for
private-pay patients (about four weeks). They were higher for services
provided by surgeons who practised only in the public sector (ten
weeks). But they were highest of all (twenty-three weeks) for publicly
financed services provided by surgeons who practised simultaneously in
both sectors.5 2 It is extremely worrying that this evidence was before the
majority judges but they nonetheless dismissed the views of expert
witnesses on the ground that they did not "present economic studies., 53
One assumes that this evidence was discounted because it did not
directly speak to the law banning private health insurance; it does of
course speak to the rationale behind the law for banning private health
insurance.
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major found that the
Quebec government had acted "arbitrarily" in precluding the purchase
of private health insurance. If there were really no substance to the
concerns of a private sector operating in tandem with a public sector,
4 U.K., Select Committee on Health, Health-Third Report. Minutes of Evidence-
Volume II (HC 586-1), App. 8 (London: House of Commons, 2000), online:
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cml99900/cmselect/cmhealth/586/586ap17.htm.>
I U.K., Select Committee on Health, Health- Third Report. Summary of Conclusions and
Recommendations (London: House of Commons, 2000) Recommendation (o) at 3, online: <http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmhealth/586/58613.htm>.
s' Stephen J. Duckett, "Private Care and Public Waiting" (2005) 29 Aust. Health Rev. 87.
"Carolyn DeCoster, Leonard MacWilliam & Randy Walld, Waiting Times for Surgery.-
1997/98 and 1998/99 Update (Winnipeg: Manitoba Centre for Health Policy and Evaluation,
University of Manitoba, 1998), online: Manitoba Health Centre for Health Policy
<http:/Avww.umanitoba.ca/centres/mchp/reports/pdfs/waits2.pdf>.
'See Chaoulh, supra note 1 at 853, McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J.
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why do the governments of Sweden, Luxembourg, Greece, and Italy
(not to mention all the provinces in Canada except for Newfoundland &
Labrador) effectively prevent physicians from working both sides of the
fence (ie. by being paid from the public purse while "topping up" their
incomes by supplying the same medically necessary care to private-pay
patients)? Why has the U.K. government tried to introduce measures
into consultants' contracts to make sure they spend more time treating
public hips and knees?54 Are all these governments "arbitrary" in their
policy choices? This seems unlikely. If one accepts those laws as
justifiable because of concerns about capacity, then Quebec's law
prohibiting private health insurance could be similarly justified.
III. THE IMPACT OF CHAOULLION PUBLIC DEBATE AND
POLICY
In the realm of public debate, Chaoulli seems to have unleashed
the idea that Canadians can have their private insurance cake and
medicare too. On the positive side, Chaoulli has opened the door for
politicians and citizens to openly discuss the possibility of a greater role
for private health insurance without running the risk of being called
heretics. On the negative side, Chaoulli has enabled those who favour
privatization to promote a greater role for private financing without
having to explain the logistics of such a system." The message of those
advocating privatization is that medicare clearly does not work, a private
system can only make things better, and the provinces should be free to
experiment with combining the two.
A. Supporters of Medicare
Those who support a single-payer, publicly funded system in
Canada have lost credibility by conflating the issues of private financing
and private delivery. For example, some proponents of medicare rail
against P3 hospitals in Ontario, which would be fully publicly funded
(thus raising no equity concerns), or private cancer clinics, which are
also fully publicly funded. The leader of the NDP, Jack Layton, has
54 Maynard & Bloor, supra note 48.'
5' John Ibbitson "Klein's Non-Partisan Health-Care Warnings" The Globe and Mail (22
November 2005) Al.
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further clouded the debate by saying that his party is opposed to any
public funding flowing to private clinics.56 He has however been
challenged on the grounds that he himself attended the Shouldice clinic,
a private for-profit hospital that specializes in hernia operations but
which is fully publicly funded.
One has to distinguish between financing and delivery, and then
between delivery by not-for-profit and delivery by for-profit firms. There
are legitimate concerns about the quality of care delivered by private
for-profit institutions in some settings, but not in all. In my view, the
issue of not-for-profit versus for-profit delivery is not as critical as the
issue of access to care as embodied in the distinction between public and
private financing. Financing and delivery become conflated in the issue
of private clinics (ie. private MRI clinics) that supply both publicly and
privately financed care. That these clinics are condoned is extremely
problematic. They starkly illuminate the problem of physicians having
an incentive to build up their more lucrative private practices rather
than treat public patients. Similarly, there are concerns with the advent
of private clinics that charge annual fees to patients (e.g. the Copeman
clinic plans to charge 2,300 dollars annually) but argue they are in
compliance with provincial laws by billing the public sector for
"medically necessary" physician services.58 The annual fees, ostensibly,
are to cover non-insured services but may well be used to indirectly
subsidize physicians who work there (treating far fewer patients than
usual) providing of public health care.
Nonetheless, vocal opposition to all things private simply clouds
the issues of what is really at stake in Chaoulli the raw prospect of a
two-tier system (such as exists in New Zealand, Ireland, and the Uni ted
Kingdom) and the prospect of longer waiting lists in the public system.
Because the most vocal opponents of privatization in Canada
have been fighting the battle of private delivery, they have been caught
off balance, ill-prepared to fight the battle against private health
insurance. The opposition to all things private makes it easy to discount
them as zealots, just as the proponents of privatization used to be
'
6 See Bill Curray "Not Opposed to Private Health Care, Layton says" The Globe andMail
(5 December 2005) A5.
" See Steven Chase "Layton Defends His Mid-'90s Visit to Private Hernia Clinic in
Toronto" The Globe and Mail(13 January 2006) A4.
'See the Copeman Health Care Centre, online: <http://www.copemanhealthcare.com>.
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written off as zealots. Phillipe Couillard, Health Minister of Quebec
stated:
I believe there is a place for private health care in our public system .... There appears
to be a perversion of the debate here in Canada and particularly in Quebec. There are
some people who associate any intrusion of private delivery of the health-care system
with some kind of social backwardness. 59
Coulliard's remarks are misleading, however, as there is already
extensive private delivery in the Canadian health care system. But
Chaoulli is not about delivery, it is about financing. Notice how
Couillard carefully avoids talking about private insurance, private
financing, two-tier systems, or queue-jumping-which is actually what
Chaoulli requires-and speaks in the far more reasonable rhetoric of
private delivery, even though at the time he spoke his government was
contemplating reform of financing.
B. Newspaper Commentary
Media commentary has grossly oversimplified the debates about
public and private health insurance. The poor grasp of health policy
reflected in the judgment of the Court has been replicated in the media
and particularly in relation to the experiences of other jurisdictions. I
will provide three examples here, all from one national newspaper, The
Globe and Mail. I acknowledge that this limited sampling does not
provide a scientific basis for proving the media's poor grasp of health
policy and I do not claim to do so. I only hope to demonstrate through a
few examples the potential scope of the problem.
The first is a commentary by Lysiane Gagnon, who states that in
its approach to public financing of health care, "Canada is in a league
with Cuba and North Korea."6 She neglects to note not only that
Canada ranks third in the world for the percentage of total spending
paid for by private health insurance but that the Canadian system allows
a significant amount of autonomy and freedom in delivery. By
comparison, physicians in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and
Ireland (not to mention Cuba and North Korea) are salaried state
9 Cited in "How Quebec Deals with Its Health Plight," Editorial, The Globe andMail(16
November 2005) A20.
'6 Lysiane Gagnon "A Pill Quebec Won't Swallow" The Globe and Mail (14 November
2005) A15.
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employees, and their hospitals are owned by the state. By effectively
dismissing the medicare system as akin to a system in a communist
country, she denigrates its larger objective of providing access to
necessary care on the basis of need and not wealth, which Canada does
through a plurality of financing and delivery mechanisms.
Gagnon goes on in the same piece to point out that the Quebec
Minister of Health has said that Quebec should find inspiration in
countries like France, the United Kingdom, and Sweden that allow two-
tier systems. She notes "only a diehard ideologue, or someone who
hasn't traveled much, can argue that countries like France and Sweden,
whose institutions were built by a succession of socialist governments,
have an unfair system."61 Gagnon is likely unaware that in Sweden
physicians are prevented from working both sides of the fence, i.e. in
both the public and the private sectors, and so as a consequence the
private insurance sector is very small. She is also probably unaware that
private health insurance in France is primarily used to pay for large out-
of-pocket costs and that many doctors are prevented from billing
(privately) above the government-set tariff. Gagnon, whilst travelling in
Sweden and France, likely did. not explore the complexities of public,
private, and social health insurance.
Similarly, Jeffrey Simpson stokes confusion around the
sustainability and affordability of medicare. In a number of columns, he
argues that the rate of spending on the health care system is
unsustainable and privatization is the solution.62 He does not advocate
complete privatization, but rather for medicare to continue with a
supplementary role for private health insurance-the New Zealand,
U.K., Irish (and Chaoulh) model. However, he does not acknowledge a
well-known truth of health spending, namely that 10 per cent of patients
account for well over 70 per cent of total spending costs-they have
chronic needs or catastrophic conditions.63  Supplementary or
61 Ibid.
6' Jeffrey Simpson "Why Health-care Posturing Won't Amount to a Hill of Beans" The
Globe and Mail (9 November 2005) A19; Jeffrey Simpson, "So, ask Mr. Harper this health
question" The Globe and Mail(13 Jaunary 2006) A17; and Jeffrey Simpson "Squaring Off Against
the Arithmetic of Health Care" The Globe andMail(24 August 2005) A17.
63 See Noralou P. Roos et al., "Does Universal Comprehensive Insurance Encourage
Unnecessary Use? Evidence From Manitoba Says 'No' (2004) 170(2) Can. Med. Assoc. J. 209 at
210. A 1999 survey of residents in Winnipeg reveals in this article that 70 per cent of the population
in the lowest use group consume just 10 per cent of health care dollars, whereas just 10 per cent of
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complementary private insurers will not cover these people and their
health care needs unless they are forced to do so by governmental
regulation: in other words, the public system must continue to absorb
the costs of complex and costly care. Unless Simpson is prepared to
advocate complete privatization either of certain expensive classes of
services or of health care for certain groups of people (i.e. the wealthy),
the introduction of private insurance to allow individuals to jump
queues for hip operations and cataract surgery will not improve the
sustainability of the public system. More than likely, the effects of a
private tier will be inflationary vis-a-vis the public tier as there is always
pressure to cover services publicly that are available privately. This may
be a good thing from the perspective of rapid adoption of new
technologies, et cetera, but one cannot say it is a good thing from the
perspective of overall costs.
A third and final example is demonstrated in an editorial in The
Globe and Mail published in December of 2005 which stated:
In two months, Quebec will launch a fierce debate about private care. It has no choice.
The Supreme Court of Canada said in June that people are suffering and dying because
of waits in the public system, and that Quebec is violating its own rights charter by not
letting them buy private health insurance for essential care. The court gave Quebec until
June 9 to allow private insurance. 64
This editorial mischaracterizes what Chaoulli requires. Quebec
laws are only unconstitutional given unacceptable wait times in the
public system. The most obvious solution-and one that would benefit
all Quebeckers and not just those able to afford private insurance-is to
reduce wait times in the public system. Characterizing Chaoulli as
requiring private insurance plays to the agenda of those politicians and
the population consume 74 per cent of the dollars. See also Evelyn L. Forget, Raisa Deber & Leslie
L. Roos, "Medical Savings Accounts: Will They Reduce Costs?" (2002) 167(2) Can. Med. Assoc. J.
43 at 145. The study determines that over a three-year period between 1997 and 1999, the lowest-
using 50 per cent of the population only accounted for 4 per cent of costs whereas the highest-using
1 per cent of the population accounted for 26 per cent of spending on hospital and physician care.
The top 10 per cent spending decile accounts for more than 70 per cent of health care costs
annually. Both studies show that only the public system can accommodate the catastrophic costs
category because the costs associated with this kind of care far exceed the ability of any one
individual to absorb them privately.
64 "Private Health Care. Let's Talk About It," Editorial, The Globe and Mail (7 December
2005) A26.
2006]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
interest groups who argue that there is no other choice now but to allow
private insurance.
IV. UNCERTAINTY AND FUTURE LITIGATION
Lamenting Chaoulli is to some extent crying over spilt milk; it
will likely be many years before the Court is able to revisit its
conclusions. But in the interim we can expect litigation across the
country. Litigation will be instituted by those hoping to break open
restrictions on the private sector: private clinics, for example.65 There
are reports of cases being developed in Ontario given that, at present,
the Liberal government of Ontario seems set to defend one-tier
medicare-at the time of writing, no action has been filed. There is also
speculation that litigation will be launched in Manitoba should the
province try to prevent private clinics from providing "medically
necessary" MRI services.66
What we can expect to see are Charter challenges to laws similar
to that of Quebec's that ban private health insurance. This is because in
reality, the ban on private health insurance is probably not as important
as the other laws across the country suppressing a developing second
tier. In a 2001 article in the Canadian Medical Association Journal, Tom
Archibald and I documented the myriad pieces of provincial legislation
that cumulatively provide disincentives for a flourishing duplicate
private tier. We concluded:
[I]n Canada, the absence of a private system is not due to the illegality of private health
care per se. Private insurance for the kinds of medically necessary hospital and physician
services that the public service is meant to cover is illegal in only 6 provinces. However,
there has been no development of a significant private sector in New Brunswick,
6 Those with vested interests in the private sector already have begun discussions on how
to "better" the Canadian health care system in light of the Chaoulli decision. For example, the
Canadian Independent Medical Clinics Association (an organization that represents private health
care clinics) recently hosted a conference in Vancouver on 11 & 12 November 2005, called "Saving
Medicare: Strategies & Solutions." The conference had a registration fee of over one thousand
dollars and speakers included Reform party founder Preston Manning, Senator Michael Kirby, Dr.
Jacques Chaoulli, Ian McPherson (the CEO of New Zealand private health insurer Southern
Cross) and Charles Auld (former CEO of U.K. based General Healthcare Group), as well as
members of the legal community and doctors currently operating private clinics in. British
Columbia.
' See Myron Love, "Chaoulli in Action: Manitoba Private Clinic Buys Its Own MRI,
Challenging Governmental Policy" Medical Post 41:41 (29 November 2005), online:
<http://www.medicalpost.com/news/article.j sp?content=20051127_205836_4484>.
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Newfoundland, Nova Scotia or Saskatchewan, all of which permit private insurance
coverage without any restriction on the extent of the coverage, although as noted Nova
Scotia is the only province among these 4 that caps the fees of all physicians (whether
opted in or out) at the public plan rates. Rather, the lack of a flourishing private sector in
Canada is most likely attributable to prohibitions on subsidization of private practice
from the public plan, prohibitions that prevent physicians from relying on the public
sector for the core of their incomes and turning to the private sector to top up their
incomes."
Given this, we are likely to see challenges not only to laws
prohibiting the sale of private insurance for essential services but to
other laws which, in my opinion, are of greater significance in protecting
the private tier. For example, we can expect to see. challenges to the laws
in Ontario, Nova Scotia, and Manitoba that preclude a physician from
charging more privately than is paid publicly for a "medically necessary"
service. We can also expect to see challenges to the laws in Alberta,
British Columbia, New Brunswick, Quebec, Saskatchewan, and Prince
Edward Island that effectively prevent the public sector from subsidizing
the privately financed sector, in such ways as by providing that patients
who opt for the services of a private physician cannot receive public
funding to pay for them.
Of course, what is not known is how a court will approach a
challenge to laws that more indirectly undercut a private tier than a ban
on private health insurance. The difficulty for challengers will be that
these laws, such as those that provide disincentives to physicians to
practise privately, indirectly achieve the goal of suppressing a private
sector. Still, it is conceivable that a court might accept that even these
more indirect prohibitions could be considered legitimate targets for
challenge. They prima facie seem to be about the economic rights of
doctors, and given that economic or contractual rights are not protected
by section 7, it will be much more difficult to build the nexus to an
infringement of life, liberty, and security of the person as was done in
Chaoulli But regardless of the merits of these kind of claims and their
likelihood of success before the courts, some provincial governments
may preempt the needs for such challenges by voluntarily changing their
laws using Cbaoullias a justification.
6 7 Flood & Archibald, supra note 12.
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V. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE
There are a number of possible governmental responses to the
Chaoulli decision; we have seen and are seeing different approaches
across the country.
A. Reduce Wait Times
The first (and best) response is to rise to the challenge and
improve wait times within the province in question so that if put to the
test, the province in question will be able to demonstrate at trial that the
wait times are reasonable and thus any law prohibiting the flourishing of
a private tier is not in contravention of section 7 of the Charter. To date,
that has been the Ontario government's response through its Wait Time
Strategy.
68
This approach of measuring and reducing wait times is one
endorsed, at least in theory, by the federal government. Specifically, the
federal government 'has agreed to invest 4.5 billion dollars over a six-
year period in the Wait Times Reduction Fund to assist provinces and
territories to train and hire more health professionals and otherwise
build health capacity. 69
Wait times are beginning to be managed better, and if success
could be claimed on that ground then the law prohibiting private health
insurance would no longer be constitutionally suspect.70 Chaoulliwould
then have achieved what many claimed to be the ultimate goal of those
(including the Canadian Medical Association and members of the
Senate) who intervened in support of the constitutional challenge.
These interveners supported the Chaoulli challenge on the grounds that
the court needed to provide the equivalent of a spur-in-the-side to lazy
governments by telling them that they are not entitled to preserve a
"monopoly" on public health insurance if they do not eliminate
Ontario, Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, "Wait Time Strategy Overview" (8
December 2004), online: <http://www.health.gov.on.ca/transformation/waittimes/strategy-
overview.pdf.>
" Health Canada, "New Federal Investments on Health: Commitments on 10-Year Action
Plan on Health" (16 September 2004), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/delivery-prestation/
fptcollab/2004-fmm-rpm/bg-fi inv e.html>.
ro Patrick J. Monahan, "Wait Times Key to Saving Medicare" The Toronto Star (17
November 2005) A27.
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unreasonable wait times." This would certainly be the best and most
optimistic interpretation of the Chaoullidecision. On the other hand, as
I discuss further below, it is equally plausible that some governments
will be more than happy to give up their "monopoly" on health care.
B. Charter-Proof through Legal Reforms
The other response open to provinces is to improve safety-valve
mechanisms-to provide ways for patients who have been waiting for
treatment to have their case reviewed and treatment expedited if
necessary either within the province, in another province, or in the
United States (in essence, a care guarantee).7" Each member of the
Supreme Court agreed that an adequate appeal mechanism was an
important determinant as to whether the Quebec laws prohibiting
private health insurance were constitutional. In other words, a province
may be able to protect its laws from Charter challenge if it provides
some sort of timely and independent means to assess when someone has
had to wait too long for care and to provide a remedy. This remedy
could take the form of ensuring immediate treatment within the
province or paying for treatment in another province or country. So far,
there has been little movement on the part of any province to embed
such protections. In the buildup to the January election in 2006, the
Liberals had pledged 75 million dollars in funding to allow patients to
travel from one province to another in the event that wait times are too
long in a patient's home province. The new Conservative government
also promised a care guarantee, its key difference from the Liberal party
platform being that it would not prohibit care to be purchased in private
clinics or in other countriesY.7 To avail themselves of these funds, it
would seem essential that provinces put in place some form of
mechanism for determining whether a patient has waited too long. How
71 Ibid
2 For a discussion on appeal mechanisms in the province of Ontario, see Caroline Pitfield
& Colleen M. Flood, "Section 7 'Safety Valves': Appealing Wait Times Within A One-Tier System"
in Flood, Roach & Sossin, supra note 1,477.
' See Conservative Party of Canada, "Harper Pledges Patient Wait Times Guarantee,"
online: Conservative Party of Canada <http://www.conservative.ca/EN/1091/33313>. See also
Health Canada, "Wait Times in Canada," online: Health Canada <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-
sss/qual/acces/wait-attente/indexe.html> which confirms the 10-year plan to strengthen health
care.
2006]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the new Conservative government---committed to provincial autonomy
on the one hand and a care guarantee on the other-will practically
implement guarantees is anyone's guess. To date the new federal
government has made no move to fulfill this election promise, and in its
first budget, it allocated no new funds to health care to achieve it.74
C. Capitulate and/or Celebrate and Allow Private Health Insurance
The third option available to provinces is to celebrate Chaoulli
and allow the introduction of a supplementary private tier.
In Chaoulli the key problem was characterized by the applicant
as the government monopoly on health insurance for essential services.
Supporters of Chaoulli, such as Stanley Hartt, have said that
government, as a monopolist, must either improve its performance or
"get out of the way" so that people can look after themselves. 5 The
characterization of government as monopolist as opposed to the
provider of a unique public good belies the fact that many governments,
for fiscal, political, or ideological reasons, may be more than happy to
give up the ongoing battle to maintain one-tier medicare. If the most
vocal and politically connected members of the electorate shift to the
private insurance sector this will likely alleviate some of the pressure on
provincial governments to perform well. It would likely make it easier
for governments to harshly ration services in the public sector,
particularly those covered by private insurance (e.g. hip and knee
surgery).76 Governments may also be tempted by the idea (even if it is
not borne out in practice) that creation of a second tier would reduce
the work that has to be done by the public sector. Some governments
will be tempted by the idea, not for fiscal reasons but for pure
ideological reasons, namely that choice and the market should be
allowed to operate freely in health care regardless of merit or
consequences.
' Canada, Department of Finance, The Budget Plan 2006 Focusing. on Priorities (Ottawa:
Department of Finance, 2006), online: Department of Finance <http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget06/pdf/
bp2006e.pdf>.
I' Stanley H. Hartt, "Arbitrariness, Randomness and the Principles of Fundamental
Justice" in Flood, Roach & Sossin, supra note 1,505.
76 Within New Zealand there is indirect evidence of a loss of political support for public
spending on services also covered by private insurance. See supra note 35. See also supra note 43
for commentary on the New Zealand wait-list booking system.
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D. Quebec's Choice
These possible choices in response confront the government of
Quebec most directly since its laws were the subject of Chaoulli It asked
for an eighteen-month stay in order to be able to better prepare itself or
respond to the overturning of the law prohibiting private health
insurance. The Court granted twelve months.77
To understand Quebec's response on this issue, some context is
important. Quebec has long allowed private clinics to flourish within the
province (in contravention of the Canada Health Ad ), and it appears
that in these clinics physicians are providing "medically necessary"
services in both the public and private sectors. For example, a Montreal
Gazette article79 reported that two Westmount medical clinics are
charging patients substantial fees for quick access to day surgery and
other procedures; the doctors at the Westmount Square Surgical Centre
and MD Specialists also bill the Quebec medicare board for those
procedures. The federal government has failed to stop this."0
To the extent that a supplementary private tier is already
tolerated in some measure in Quebec, Chaoulli may well be viewed as
an opportunity to expand the boundaries of that tier, to legitimize
existing practice, and perhaps to put some other rules of the game in
place. Indeed, Chaoulli may have been greeted behind closed doors by
the Quebec government with relief rather than chagrin.
The initial signs suggested that the Quebec government would
use the Chaoulli decision as support for further privatization of the
Quebec system in ways not required by the terms of the decision.
7 Jacques Chaoulli ct George Zeliotis c. Procureur gdndral du Qu6bec et Procureur
g6ndral du Canada (0c) (4 August 2005), Supreme Court of Canada Rehearing - 29272, online:
Supreme Court of Canada Bulletin of Proceedings <http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/bulletin/
2005/05-08-12-bul.wpd/05-08-12-bul.wpd.pdf>. The judgment reads: "The motion for a partial
rehearing is granted. The Court's judgment is stayed for a period of 12 months from the date such
judgment was issued, namely June 9, 2005."
78 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6.
79 Aaron Derfel "Montreal Leads the Country in Offering Private Health Care" The
Montreal Gazette (12 February 2005) Al.
o Office of the Auditor.General of Canada, "Health Canada-Federal Support of Health
Care Delivery" in 2002 Status Report, c. 3, online: 2002 Reports of the Auditor General.of Canada
< http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20020903ce.html >. Health Canada has
recently addressed enforcement issues. See Health Canada, News Release, "Canadian Public
Health Care Protection Initiative" (3. November 2005), online: Health Canada <http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/media/notices-avis/prope.html >.
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Premier Jean Charest is reported as saying in the National Assembly
that he had received an "order" from the Supreme Court of Canada to
make room for the private sector in the health care system. It was
reported that Quebec is proposing to allow doctors to practise both in
the publicly financed system and in a parallel, privately financed system
in which private insurance companies would play a role. As six Quebec
law professors point out in an opinion editorial in the Montreal Gazette,
the Court issued no such order and, of course, it is open for the Quebec
government to respond by reducing wait times for all, rather than by
opening a private tier.'
On 16 February 2006 the Quebec government released its
proposed response to Chaoull12 The Quebec proposals include a broad
range of initiatives, but from the perspective of a direct impact on wait
times the most pertinent reform proposal is the implementation of two
different types of care guarantee.
The first care guarantee is with regard to radio-oncology, cancer
surgery, and advanced cardiac care. The proposal read that the
guarantee will provide for a three-month maximum wait, then the public
sector will pay for care in a private clinic or outside of Quebec. No
private insurance may be purchased to cover this kind of care. The irony
is, of course, that in countries with duplicate private insurance, private
insurers don't insure this kind of care-it is too expensive and not
profitable enough. In other words, even if it were lawful to sell it and
buy it, the market would not materialize for it in Quebec.
The second kind of care guarantee covers hip, knee, and cataract
surgery-in these cases the guarantee is that after a six-month wait then
the government will pay for treatment in a private clinic. If a patient is
still waiting after nine months, then the government will pay for care
out-of-province. The proposal provides that for these kinds of care (hip,
knee, and cataract surgery) patients can now buy private insurance-for
these services only. So the impugned law at the heart of the Chaoulli
81 Henri Brun et al. "Quebec Medicare Plan is Not What the Supremes Ordered" The
Gazette (17 November 2005) A29.
82 Quebec, Minist~re de la Sant6 et des Services sociaux, Guaranteeing Access. Meeting the
Challenges of Equity, Efficiency, and Quality (Consultation document) (Quebec: La Direction des
communications du minist~re de la Sant6 et des Services sociaux, 2006), online:
<http://publications.msss.gouv.qc.ca/acrobat/f/ documentation/2005/05-721-01A.pdf>.
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decision will be liberalized, but only to the extent of allowing the sale of
private insurance for hip, knee, and cataract surgery.
The Quebec government is planning a very measured set of
proposals that contains a variety of disincentives for a two-tier system to
flourish. The proposals cut across the gambit of possible public/private
solutions to the Chaoulli decision that I outlined earlier. They are what I
would characterize as a Goldilocks solution-a sophisticated response
to the Chaoulli decision, balancing the demands of the Court with the
reality of health policy.
First, the introduction of wait-time guarantees within the
publicly financed health care system is a public fix to a public problem,
the best response one could hope for to the Chaoullidecision. However,
in order to get wait times down, it will require significant changes within
the system, changes that many players have long been resisting (ie.
centralization of waiting lists-out of doctors' desk drawers and into
regional or provincial management, creating more capacity by changing
scope of practice, et cetera).
Second, the proposals provide for a much more significant kind
of reform in terms of public funding and private for-profit delivery.
Rather than taking on the difficult political task of changing practices
within public medicare-and challenging many vested interests-the
easier response is to bring in more capacity by allowing publicly financed
delivery by private for-profit clinics. This is what I would call the middle
ground, and it follows the response to wait times made by Tony Blair's
government in the United Kingdom-the system remains publicly
funded but extra capacity is injected into the system by allowing private
clinics.
This is, of course, a much more preferable option in terms of
access than allowing a duplicate private tier as was endorsed by the
Supreme Court of Canada. It tries to ensure improved access for all
Quebeckers, and allowing delivery by private clinics might get around
some of the embedded stickiness associated with expanding public
hospitals-if you expand capacity in a public hospital, it is virtually
impossible to reduce it later when needs change. However, there are still
many concerns with this option. The experience in the United Kingdom
suggests we need to be attentive to the following possibilities:
- the bifurcation of responsibility between public hospitals and
private clinics with the former getting the tough cases and the latter the
easier cases, often at higher rates of remuneration;
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- problems associated with the training of junior doctors in
hospitals when the easiest kinds of care are no longer performed in
public hospitals;
- the reality that bringing on extra capacity will most likely
result in extra public spending and result in additional concerns for
provincial governments around sustainability;
- and, finally, that in the absence of new resources or greater
efficiencies, money spent on wrestling with wait times may well be at the
expense of other needs.
E. Private Insurance
The final plank of the Quebec government's proposals that I will
discuss is removing the law prohibiting private health insurance. It is
interesting that the Quebec government is not proposing to defend this
law given its proposals for wait time guarantees. Senator Kirby and the
Canadian Medical Association argued before the Supreme Court that
wait time guarantees would be the only way for the Quebec government
to be able to legitimate the law prohibiting private health insurance. So
why liberalize the law given that wait-time guarantees are promised?
We will have to see how the Court responds to this proposal,
which is the inverse of what may have been expected. Where wait-time
guarantees are in place, the Quebec government could arguably defend
itself from constitutional challenge, and where they are not, it has to
remove the laws prohibiting private health insurance.
From the perspective of those on waiting lists for other kinds of
care, there is every reason to be concerned-as attention and resources
are devoted to reducing wait times in these specified areas, in all
likelihood, there will be fewer resources and less incentives to deal with
other needs. Thus, if anything, there is an even stronger argument on
the side of those left out of Quebec's wait-time guarantees that they
should have a constitutional right to private health insurance. Of course,
as I have discussed earlier, this right is largely meaningless for those
presently on waiting lists-no private insurer will cover a patient who
has a condition.
On a very positive note, the Quebec government appears
persuaded, at least to some degree, by those who reacted strongly to
early suggestions that the laws prohibiting doctors working in both the
public and the private sectors should be liberalized. The Quebec
government says it will keep this law. Currently, there are only one
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hundred Quebec doctors who have chosen to opt out of the public
system and practise privately-far more than in any other province. We
will have to see whether the demand for private insurance will
significantly increase the size of the private market and with it the
enticement for doctors to move from the public sector to the private
sector, or whether, as I have argued here, that the effect will not be
significant unless and until doctors are able to work simultaneously in
the public and private sectors. In any event, the Quebec government
also stated that it would consider restricting the number of doctors
opting out if the numbers become too high and deplete public system
resources.
F. Alberta 's Stance
Although not required to respond to the Chaoulli decision, the
Klein government of Alberta released its proposal for reform on 28
February 2006.83 Ralph Klein, the premier of Alberta, copying the Blair
government in the United Kingdom, named his initiatives for health
policy reform "the third way." But Blair's third way and Klein's third
way have several degrees of separation between them. The Blair
government's initiatives are not about expanding the role for private
insurance or private payment; indeed, its reforms in health care have
been characterized by an unprecedented increase in the investment of
public funds.' The Blair third way involves the use of greater incentives
for performance and a greater role for competition between providers in
order to harness the drive and efficiency of the private sector in the
public delivery of health services to achieve equitable goals.85 Blair's
Alberta, Ministry of Health and Wellness, News Release, "Alberta health care renewal
focuses on balance" (28 February 2006), online: Government of Alberta <http://www.gov.ab.ca/acn
/200602/19506B2146229-0A7D-942D-E9B71DD4FD88C882.html>.
' In 2000 the Blair government pledged to increase government spending in the National
Health Service up to a level on par with the national average of the European Union, which the
Blair government estimated to be 8 per cent of GDP. In 2002 the government committed to increase
investment by 7.5 per cent per year, which will result in the share of GDP being spent on healthcare
rising to 9.4 per cent in 2007. This means spending in 2007-2008 will reach 92 billion pounds, up
from 69 billion pouhds in 2003. See Sheila Leatherman & Kim Sutherland, "Quality of Care in the
NHS of England" (2004) 328 Brit. Med. J. (U.S.) 144; Rebecca Coombes, "Brown Confirms a 7.1%
Rise in NHS Spending Next Year" (2004) 329 Brit. Med. J. 128.
85 Penelope Dash, "New Providers in UK Health Care" (2004) 3285 Brit. Med. J. 340;
Julian Le Grand, "Further Tales from the British National Health Service" Health Affairs 21:3
(May 2002) 116; and British Medical Association, "The New 2003 National Consultant Contract for
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third way is about improving productivity in the public system, not
dismantling the public system or undermining equity goals by greater
reliance on private financing.
Overall, the platform of proposals put forward by Alberta are
sophisticated and speak to many important issues in health care system
reform; I do not discount them. However, the key measure of concern
from the perspective of the one-tier/two-tier debate, impeded within this
larger plan, was a proposal to liberalize the law allowing physicians to
work simultaneously in the public and private tier. This proposal is not
required by the terms of Chaoulli given that the decision spoke to a
different law (the law preventing the purchase of private health
insurance) and that Chaoullidoes not require the province of Alberta to
respond. It is also of note that, in its proposals, Alberta did not provide
for any form of wait-time guarantee in the public system-in other
words there would be no entitlement to timely treatment in the public
sector, which coupled with a flourishing private tier would allow
medicare to decline and waiting lists to grow. The public backlash to
Klein's third way proposal was strong and immediate. This backlash
ultimately resulted in the government deciding not to proceed with the
proposal as initially drafted. On 20 April 2006, Health Minister Iris
Evans announced that the legislation would be tabled pending further
public consultation.86 Klein may have left his run on Canadian medicare
too late as some members of his own caucus were not supportive of his
health care reforms. As a result, Klein "all but lost the leadership vote"
at the Conservative Party convention on 31 March 2006.87
Klein's proposals saw medicare balanced on a knife edge.
Fortunately, because of political forces destabilizing Premier Klein at
the end of his long and successful career, he was not able to bed down
those reforms in Alberta. That it should have come so close, however, is
directly due to the fallout of the Chaoullidecision.
England-a Summary by the BMA's Central Consultants & Specialists Committee" (September
2003), online: <http://www.bma.org.uk/ap.nsf/Content/CCSCContractSummary>.
8 6Alberta, Ministry of Health and Wellness, News Release, "New health bill process invites
Albertans' input (20 April 2006), online: Government of Alberta <http:/www.gov.ab.ca/acn/200604
/19746B9640965-0AAF-E3D0-465A26C4954F3D02.html>.
8 7Graham Thomson "Disappointed the 'Third Way' Crashed and Burned? Blame Ralph"
The Edmonton Journal(22 April 2006) A19.
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VI. CONCLUSION
I will conclude, in the spirit of media soundbites, with the top
ten reasons why Canadians, despite what their politicians, the media and
a majority of the Supreme Court are telling them, should not embrace
private health insurance for essential hospital and physician services:
10. Countries in which private spending is high spend more in
total on health care, not less. The United States already spends more
public dollars per capita than Canada does but leaves 48 million
Americans uninsured.
9. We have a shortage of doctors and nurses. Most developed
countries do. Wealthier provinces are luring doctors from poorer
provinces. This problem will be exacerbated with the introduction of
private insurance coverage for services that are presently publicly
insured like hip operations. Doctors will move their business into the
private tier. They will do work that is elective in nature for the not-so-
needy, leaving those with greater need to wait even longer for care in
the public system.
8. A two-tier system is one in which one can buy private
insurance to jump queues and doctors are free to work part of their day
in the public system doing public hip operations for public-pay patients
and part of the day in the private system doing hip operations for those
who pay privately. This is what is being mooted by the Quebec and
Alberta governments as a good idea. That it is not a good idea is
demonstrated by countries that already have two-tier systems, like the
United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Ireland, where there are very long
public waiting lists. Why copy them?
7. In countries that have two-tier systems, only a relatively small
percentage of the population holds private health insurance (e.g. 11.4
per cent of U.K. citizens), and their doing so is closely associated with
their wealth. In other words, the vast majority of Canadians would not
benefit from being able to buy private health insurance since either they
will not qualify for it or they will not be able to afford the premiums.
6. From the perspective of a private insurance company, if you
are on a waiting list you do not have insurable risk. You do not have a
risk of disease or illness, you have the disease or illness-current needs
that must be met. If you cannot pay cash, the public system is the only
option. Zeliotis, the patient at the heart of the Supreme Court's decision
in Chaoullk, exposes the fallacy in the idea that private health insurance
will fix our waiting list problems. Zeliotis, sixty-five years old and with
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pre-existing heart and hip conditions, simply would not qualify for
private health insurance, at least not for those conditions.
5. Do not buy into the suggestion that Canadian medicare is in
league with communist states like Cuba and North Korea. We are third
in the world in terms of the private health insurance contribution to the
financing of our system. Physicians and hospitals are not employed and
owned by the state. We already have a significant level of private
financing and private delivery, higher than many other developed
countries. The real question is whether privatizing insurance for
essential services will make our system better or worse.
4. NAFTA requires that we must compensate U.S.-based private
insurers for denying them access to Canadian "markets" if we
subsequently change our mind about the benefits of two-tier insurance.88
3. Many countries (e.g. Sweden) and nearly all provinces protect
the public system by way of laws preventing doctors being paid both
publicly and privately for essential services. These laws require that
doctors either work wholly in the public sector or wholly in the private
sector. Quebec and Alberta are considering changing this law even
though the Supreme Court decision in Chaoullidoes not require this.
2. Governments and health care providers can fix waiting lists.
Together they have been able to achieve extraordinary improvements,
for example, in cardiac care treatments in Ontario and with respect to
orthopaedic services in Alberta.89 There is now little or no waiting for
diagnosis and treatment; most of these gains have been achieved by
better coordination of existing resources and our talent. We can and will
do it in other areas. Victory is within our grasp.
1. And the top reason why we shouldn't allow private health
insurance for essential services? Access to essential care should be based
on need and not on ability to pay. If resources are constricted, we should
revisit what is or is not essential, not allow a two-tier system for what
indeed is essential. We should operate a health care system, not a wealth
care system.
88 For a full discussion, see Tracey Epps & David Schneiderman, "Opening Medicare to
Our Neighbours or Closing the Door on a Public System? International Trade Implications of
Chaoulli v. Quebec' in Flood, Roach & Sossin, supra note 1, 369.
89 Kelly Cryderman "Waits for Hip, Knee Surgery Cut By 90%: Pilot Project Yields
'Phenomenal Results"' The Edmonton Journal (19. December 2005) Al; Dawn Walton "Alberta
Slashes Wait Times on Some Surgeries" The Globe and Mail (20 December 2005) Al.
[VOL. 44, No. 2
